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CIVIL AVIATION-PROBLEMS ARISING IN WORICMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
By Mildred Meyers Binzer*

I.
INTRODUCTION

The field of Workmen's Compensation has not as yet been
4'occupied" by any of the federal legislation enacted for Civil
Aviation. Several attempts to so do have been made and a consideration of the question seems to be timely, because of the
-various and widely differing bills on civil aviation that have
been proposed.
Because of the mobility of the air transport industry and
the number of different states in which a given air line operates, the matter of the choice of law with respect to workmen's
compensation is of considerable importance. The industry has
already had some experiences which have been unfortunate. It
'has happened, for example, that although an airline had qualified under the workmen's compensation law of one state, it was
later held that it should likewise have qualified under the law
of another state, and in default of doing so, it lost all protection
in an accident occurmg in the other state.
As in any litigation for relief under the claim of Workmen's Compensation, the plaintiff's rights depend upon the
wording of the applicable statute, but in the cases arising from
the aviation industry the question that is becoming more and
more important, is what statute is applicable, that is,who
(what state) has jurisdiction. Which state law prevails in this
instance 2
Under the laws of X state plaintiff might have a clear right
to recovery, but in state Y plaintiff might have no claim at all.
-Or again in state A plaintiff may have only a fraction of the
amount he could recover in state B. In one state plaintiff may
:Univ. of Mich., Univ of Toledo, LL.B. 1946. Law Librarian,
Univ of Toledo, 1945-46. Member, Ohio and Federal Bars. Author:
Civil Avation-Relative Scope of Jurisdiction of the State and Federal Government, 33 Ky L. J. 276; Civil Aviation-Liability Problems of Air Carriers, 34 Ky L. J. 34 (reprinted Ins. L. J., March,
1946. Address: 424 Gardner Bldg., Toledo 4, Ohio.
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be an employee, in another he may be considered as an independent contractor.
QUESTIONS PRESEN-TED

In order to prevent such uncertainty and confusion it has
been proposed at different times to enact federal legislation on
this question which thereafter would govern. From the outset
of such proposals two questions arose. First, whether there is
need for the enactment of such statutes, that is, whether there
is, at present, in conflict of laws principles in the field of workmen s compensation "uncertainty and confusion" to an extent
which warrants clarifying federal legislation. Second, assuming
that there is an urgent need for such clarification, it is essential
to consider whether Congress under the Constitution may resolve the uncertainties in this field by authorizing regulations
governing the choice of state law.
II.
Is THERE CONFLICT 9
1.

Statements from Authorities.

In a statement made by David L. Behncke, the President of
the Air Line Pilots Association, it is said
"Relating to injury and disability compensation
for the airline pilots, they are now governed in a
piece-meal fashion by the various state compensation
laws-an arrangement that is highly unsatisfactory
Injury and disability compensation for airline pilots
and other airline employees should be federalized and
"
made uniform
"All branches of control of air transportation and
long distance flying generally should lean decidedly
toward Federal control and the basis of everything
that is related to this question is, we believe, based on
who has jurisdiction of the air spaces over the United
States-the Federal Government or the States. It is
inherently a Federal control problem, and the sooner
legislation is created to establish such control, the
better it will be for all concerned."2
Hearing before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Affairs (1943).
'Excerpts from Report on Committee on Aeronautical Law of
the American Bar Association, 64 A. B. A. Rep. 170 (1939)

KENTUCKY LAWv JOURNAL

The American Bar Association 3 has been making a study of
civil aviation and its regulation for over twenty years and at one
of its recent annual meetings adopted the following resolution.
"
That the American Bar Association endorse
the principle that, (a) maximum development of the
air commerce of the nation is in the public interest;
(b) uniformity of law and regulation of such air cornmerce including its economic and safety regulation,
control and the certification of air-craft and airman,
is necessary to bring about its maximum development;
(c) such uniform regulation and control can only be
accomplished through federal legislation

The need for federal regulation of all commercial transportation for hire by air is especially important. The regulation of
this branch of aviation is extremely technical and safety demands the highest standards.
Likewise the essential characteristics of air transport are altogether different from those of land carriers. Air transportation knows no road bed. Navigating the air is even more free of
defined pathways than navigating the ocean.
The Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce has stated -4
"While the airplane and the automobile both date
from the beginning of this century the two industries
are fundamentally different. The automobile has
had wide private use. The airplane on the other hand
has been used principally in public service, and therefore the industry is almost dependent upon government" policy
It should be administered with broad regard
for the public interest."

In the hearings held for the Lea Bill5 on Civil Aviation, it
was said.
"We do not assume that H. R. 3420 meets all of
civil aviation's legislative needs. Many matters not
dealt with in this Bill require study. Liability salvage,
workmens' compensation, relations with surface carriers and development of new safety devices-and
numerous other problems may still require attention."

2.

Three Leadig Modern Workmiei's Comipensation Cases.

Herein we shall analyze the prevailing trends m Workmen's
Compensation cases generally and the corresponding problems
64 A. B. A. Rep. 11-13 (1939)
'"Air Power" (1946)
Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 1943 (statement by
Hon. Clarence F Lea)
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and decisions in Workmen's Compensation cases m civil aviation.
The three leading Workmen's Compensation cases today are
Bradford Electric Co. v Clapper;6 Alaska Packers Ass'n v
Conz-m7sszon; 7 Pacific Is. Co. v Covtmisswn.8
In the Bradford case, Clapper had been employed by the
defendant electric company in Vermont. Defendant company
was a citizen and a resident of Vermont, but had lines extending
into New Hampshire. Clapper also was a resident of Vermont,
and was there employed to work both in Vermont and New
Hampshire. "hile performing his duties m New Hampshire he
was ldlled.
The Vermont workmen's compensation law in effect at the
time Clapper was hired provided that a worknan hired within
the state should be entitled to compensation pursuant to its provisions and to the exclusion of all other remedies under the laws
of any other state, regardless of where the injury was suffered.
The New Hampshire employer's liability act provided that
it should apply only to employers who had filed a declaration
of election to accept the act. However, even if the employer had
so elected, the employee subsequent to the injury might himself
elect to sue for damages at common law. The defendant company here had filed such a declaration in New Hampshire.
In the present action Clapper's administratrix brought suit
a-a'nst the company in New Hampshire and elected to sue for
negligence in accordance with the election allowed by the New
Hampshire statute. The defendant company invoked the full
faith and credit clause, and set up the defense that the action
was barred by the provisions of the Vermont compensation act,
since by that act the parties by entering into their contract of
employment in Vermont had accepted the Vermont law as exclusively applicable to injuries by the employee regardless of
where they might be incurred. The case was transferred to the
Federal courts and both the district court and the circuit court
had held that the action had been properly brought under the
laws of New Hampshire. This holding was reversed by the
Supreme Court.
0286 U.S. 145 (1932).
7294 U.S. 532 (1935).
1306 U.S. 466 (1938).
L..-3
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Justice Brandeis pointed out that the Vermont statute
clearly would have precluded the bringing of the action in Vermont to enforce the New Hampshire law, but here the question
was whether New Hampshire was free to disregard that provsion of the Vermont law declaring that the rights created by the
latter should be exclusive even where the injuries were suffered
in another state-that on the facts a constitutional question was
raised by the full faith and credit clause. There can be no doubt,
the Court said, that a state statute is a "public act"-within the
meaning of that clause.
The Court admitted that under the full faith and credit
clause "there is room for some plays of conflicting policy" but
countered this argument by denying that the Vermont act was
contrary to Newr Hampshire policy, basing its conclusion apparently on the consideration that recognition of the Vermont
law was asked by way of defense.
"A State may on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign
cause of action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy,
leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so
that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to
give effect to a substantive defense under the applicable law of another State, as under the circumstances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable liability This may not be done."
Then the Court applies the theory that as between these
two conflicting laws, that of the State having the paramount or
superior "interest" in the situation should govern, and in this
case the interest of New Hampshire was only casual.
This case then appears to hold that the workmen's compensation law in effect at the place of contracting, if by its terms
declared to be an exclusive remedy, must by virtue of the full
faith and credit clause be recognized as a defense to an action
brought under the law of another state in which the employee
is injured. In such cases, since the law of the state of contracting
is invoked only as a defense, and not as a basis for affirmative
relief, the state of the injury cannot be heard to say that the
lex locz. contractus is obnoxious to its policy-if the state of contracting has a superior "interest" in the controversy
The decision in the Alaska Packers case 9 does not appear to
be inconsistent in any fundamental respect with the Bradford.
case. There the employee was a citizen of Mexico and a nonresi"Supra, note 7.
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dent of California who executed with his employer m California,
a written contract of employment in which the employee agreed
to work in Alaska during the salmon canning season. Both par
ties agreed that compensation for any injuries suffered by the
employee in the course of his employment should be subject to
the provisions of the Alaska workmen's compensation law.
The California law as construed -was applicable where the
contract of employment was made in California, to all controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the state, and
this regardless of whether the employee was a resident of Califorma at the time the contract was made. California law also
provides that "no contract rule or regulation shall exempt the
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this act."
Plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment in
Alaska. The Alaska law provided that it should be the exclusive
remedy for injuries there suffered. The employee returned to
California and brought suit under the California act. The
California court held that a conflict existed between the California and the Alaska laws, but decided that neither the federal
due process, nor full faith and credit clauses required it to
follow the Alaska law.
This decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court saying "while under the due process clause the power to
control the legal consequences of a tortious act committed elsewhere has been denied, the liability to workmen's compensation
is not a tort" but "it is imposed as an incident of the employment relationship."
Apparently objections under the due process clause cannot
be made to a court's refusal to enforce the law of another state
with respect to parties over whose "status" the forum has
"control." Such questions can be raised only where the exercise
of this power is "so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a
denial of due process." The power of a state to effect legal consequence is not limited to occurrences within the state if it has
control over the status which gives rise to those consequences.
The court pointed out the hardship which would be imposed upon the employee if he were forced to return to Alaska
to sue, after having come back to California to collect is wages
under the contract.
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On the full faith and credit point, the Court stated "Prima
facie every State is entitled to enforce in its own courts, its own
statutes, lawfully enacted" and -one who challenges that right
under the full faith and credit clause "assumes the burden of
showing
that of the conflicting interests involved those of
the foreign State are superior to those of the forum."
"And so in the present case, the California law is to be
applied in the California courts, unless the employer can show
that Alaska has a superior interest."
In the third case, Pacific Insurance Co. v Commisszon"I the
injured employee was a resident of Massachusetts and regularly
employed there. lie was sent by his employer to the latter's
branch factory in California to act temporarily as a technical
adviser. While in California he remained subject to the general
direction and control of the employer's TMassachusetts office,
from which his compensation was paid. lie was injured in California and instituted proceedings for compensation under the
California law. Under the Massachusetts law, the employee's
right to recover for personal injuries "was restricted to the
compensation provided by the Massachusetts act for injuries
received in the course of his employment, whether within or
without the Commonwealth." The California law by its terms
applied where an employee was injured within the State. And,
as has been noted in the Alaska Packers case (above) it also
provided that "no contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this act."
The defendant insurance carrier insisted that the M[assachusetts act must be given effect and held to be the employees'
exclusive remedy under the Bradford Electric Co. case (see
above), and that the employee, therefore, was not entitled to relief under the California law. The Court said.
the very nature of the Federal union of States
precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as a
means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes
in the case of
of other states for its own statutes
statutes, the extra state effect of which Congress has
not prescribed
the full faith and credit clause does
not require one state to substitute for its own statute
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state."
"

"oSupra,note 8.
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The Court then distinguished the Bradford Electric case
and intimated that if the Vermont statute was shown to be obnoxious to New Hampshire policy, the Bradford decision would
have gone the other way
In the present case, it was said the Massachusetts law was
obnoxious to the policy of California, not only because there was
a conflict between the two, "but the California law, in addition
provides that no contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this act."
These three decisions really bring up the question as to what
conflict of law principles in the workmen's compensation field
are dictated by the Federal Constitution. The law in effect
where the contract was made is not determinative; it was applied in the Bradford and Alaska Packers' cases, but the lex for
was applied in the Pacific Insurance case. Domicile and residence may be considered as factors in some cases, but not in
others. And so with the other points of argument.
Therefore it seems pertinent to consider whether there is
any doctrine or test which is consistently applied in these cases.
There seem to be three such concepts (1) That State which
d'controls the status" of the parties, (2) That State having
"9asuperior interest" in the controversy, and (3) "a public
policy" existing at the forum to which the foreign law is obnoxious. Basically, however, these are mere "tags" and give
little aid in determining, in advance, what a court will decide.
To extract any definite principle, as evidenced by these three
leading cases, seems to be a baffling task, and, therefore, it
seems to be appaxent that there is "uncertainty and confusion"
in Workmen's Compensation cases generally
:3. Modern Civil Aviation Cases on Workmen's Compensation
Issues.
Following we shall survey the recent deeisions rendered in
the aviation cases.
JURISDICTION AND OTHER PROBLEMS

In determining which of two or more Workmen's Compensation Acts is applicable, the -trend of decisions -n the cur
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rent aviation cases seems to show that the courts have decided
on the basis of the location of the industry, rather than the
place where the accident occurs, or the place where the employee's contract was made. 1
" L Colonial Air Transport v. Tallman, 234 App. Div 809
(N.Y. 1932). Compensation was allowed in New York under the
Workmen's Compensation Act where the contract was made in New
York and decedent was not employed to work in a fixed place outside the state.
2. Severson v. Hanford Tn-State Airlines, Inc., 309 U.S. 660, 60
Sup Ct. 514 (1939). A Delaware corporation whose business is localized in Minnesota, employed plaintiff by oral contract in Iowa to fly
between St. Paul, Minneapolis and Chicago. Plaintiff was injured m
Wisconsin. The Court held that the Minnesota law was applicable,
the place where the business was located.
3. United Airlines Transport Co. and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v Industrial Commission of State of Utah, et al., 175 P
2d 752, 2 Avi. 14268 (Utah, 1944) on the question of an employee
killed while temporarily in the state.
4. Lorna Livermore as Administratrix v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 6 Wash. 2d 1, 106 P 2d 578, 1 Avi. 814 (1939). Workmen's
Compensation law held to be applicable to a non-resident employer
with respect to any of its workers living and working in Washington
regardless of where the contract of employment was entered into.
See also:
5. Bisson, Adm. v Winnepesaukee Air Service, Inc., et al., 91
N.H. 73, 13 A. 2d 821 (1940) on construing "employment outside of
the state."
and
6. Alexander v Movietone News, Inc., 273 N.Y. 511, 6 N.E. 2d
604, 1937 U.S. Av R. 167 (1937), cert. den. 301 U.S. 702.
7. Spelar, Administratrix v American Overseas Airlines, Inc.,
75 F Supp. 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), 2 Avi. 14,479 and 14,567. The
plaintiff's intestate, an employee of the defendant air carrier, was
killed in a crash in Newfoundland, during the course of his regular
employment as flight engineer. Defendant is a Delaware corporation
with its principal office located in New York City and decedent had
been a resident of New York City, and under the New York statutes,
plaintiff was allowed workmen's compensation.
8. Duskin, Executrix v Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 71
F Supp. 867 (W.D. Tenn. 1947) 2 Avi. 14,427 and 14,594. Plaintiff's
decedent, a resident of New York, was employed by Pennsylvama
Central Airlines,. a Delaware corporation with principal offices in
Pittsburgh, Pa. The contract of employment provided that all the
rights and obligations of the parties should be governed by the laws
of the State of Pennsylvania. The decedent, whose base of operations
was LaGuardia Field, New York, was killed in the course of his
employment in Alabama. Here the court held that decedent was a
Pennsylvania employee of the defendant corporation, and held that
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation should govern. Contra
to theory of "superior interest.," Since reversed and remanded for
new trial, April 14, 1948, 2 Avi. 14,594.
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There still seems to be some confusion as to whether an am12
phibian plane is a water craft or an aircraft.
In Charleton v Schwartz' 3 which involved the question
of the death of an airline pilot on a foreign mission, the next of
kin was denied compensation under the Longshoremen and
Harbor Worker's Act.
In intrastate flying it has been definitely held that the application of Workmen's Compensation is wholly within the
jurisdiction of the State courts.
In a Wisconsin case, 14 it was urged that the Federal government had sole jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of aircraft
navigation is vested solely in the Federal government. The court
held that it was true that although the pilot was engaged in
intrastate flying, the Federal Air Commerce Act and the air
traffic rules of the Department of Commerce were applicable
under the Wisconsin statutes, but that it was m no wise apparent that either Congress or the Department of Commerce has
adopted any rule as to the compensation of injured employees.
Later in Parker v Granger, 5 it was again stated that intrastate flight is not regulated by the Federal government and
it is a question to be decided by the proof as to whether the regulation of intrastate flying is necessary to protect interstate
flying.' 1
The state statutes and decisions have shown a great variance as to persons covered. In Minnesota a pilot employed by the
state on a glider soaring program was considered covered by
7
Workmen's Compensation as a state employee.'
2 1. Remhardt v. Newport Flying Service, 232 N.Y. 115, 133
N.E. 371 (1921) A hydroplane was determined to be a vessel within

Admiralty laws under certain conditions. Here the craft was moored

and so considered to be a vessel.
2. Sue Dollins, Adm. v Pan-American Grace, 27 F Supp. 487, 1
Avi. 834 (1939). Here, an aircraft of amphibian type was considered
not to be a vessel within the meaning of Sections 4283-4289 Revised
operation of aircraft on water is merely an auxiliary
Statutes "
function. Congress could not have had such a craft in mind when
enacting the statutes."
65 F Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
' 4 Sheboygan Airways, Inc. v 'Industrial Commission, 209 Wis.
352, 245 N.W 178, 1 Avi. 413 (1932)
" Parker, et al. v Granger, Inc. et al., 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P 2d
226, 298 U.S. 664, 1 Avi. 590 (1935)
"6See also Neiswanger v. Goodyear, et al. 55 Fed. 761, 1 Avi. 157
(1929).
"Goss v. McJunkin, 157 Kan. 684, 143 P 2d 659, 1944 US. Av.
R. 55, 1 Avi. 1118 (1943).
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In an Oklahoma case, the occupation of an airline pilot and
instructor who was injured while performing mechanical duties
was held to be a hazardous occupation within the Oklahoma
Workmen's Compensation Act.is
In Texas, 19 a garage mechamc was allowed compensation
for injuries sustained while working on an airplane even though
the policy did not expressly mention airplanes.
In the State of Washington, 20 in a suit to compel the Washington Department of Labor to recognize that certain employees come within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, it was held that the intent of the legislature was to bring
the business of airplane manufacturing under the act but not to
include "airplane pilots, instructors or other employees of air
transportation companies engaged in actual flying" Whether
other non-flying employees of an air transport company are
covered was left undecided.
The Utah statutes grant the Industrial Commission power
to allow a flight instructor reasonable workmen's compen21
sation.
In Oklahoma it has been held that an airport is a factory
and a workshop within the terms of the Worknen's Compensa22
tion Act.
In Iowa a pilot who, to increase his own experience, was
flying an airplane to a purchaser was held to be covered by
workmen's compensation.

23

In Texas, a theater manager who was killed while flying on
an advertising trip was held to be furthering the theater's
Is Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v State Industrial Com., 151 Okla. 67,
See also:
1 P 2d 682, 1931 U.S. Av R. 216, 1 Avi. 279 (1931).
v. State Industrial Com., 169 P 2d 752 (Okla. 1945).
Sowinski
9
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v Arnold, 1 S.W 2d 434
(Tex. Civ App.), 1928 U.S. Av R. 301, 1 Avi. 101 (1927)

'Waslngton ex rel. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Hoover, 200
Wash. 277, 93 P 2d 346, 1941 U.S. Av. R. 209, 1 Avi. 848 (1939). See
also: Rhodenbaugh Adm. v Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y., 67
F Supp. 379, 2 Avi. 14,210 (1946) in regard to ground crew members.
", Anderson v Industrial Com. of Utah, 108 Utah 52, 157 P 2d
253, 1 Avi. 1262 (1945)
- Ft. Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Com., supra, note 18.
SKnipe v Skelgas Co., 229 Iowa 740, 294 N.W 880, 141 U.S. Av.

R. 16, 1 Avi. 934 (1940). See also: Schonberg v. Zinmaster Baking
Co., 173 Minn. 414, 217 N.W 481, 1 Avi. 111 (1929)

and Hammer v.

General Electric X-Ray Corp., et al., Dec. 23, 1931. Minn. Industrial
Commission. 1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 242.
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business and so allowed workmen's compensation;24 while in
Pennsylvania, 25 a salesman killed in a flying accident while
calling on prospective customers on the theory that the flight
or constructively in the furtherance of the busiwas not "
ness or affairs of his employer"
In Ohio, 2 G a ground mechanic who also had the duty to taxi
planes from the hangars to the starting liner, followed his foreman who was not a licensed pilot into the plane and they took
ofr, and crashed shortly after. The court held that the question
of whether he so acted in obedience to orders connected with his
employment was for the jury to decide and in this instance it
was so held, although the court said that the foreman who
piloted the plane was definitely outside the scope of his own employment, and his estate was not entitled to workmen's compensation.
In Owens v Bennett Air Service, et al.,2 7 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the claimant who was injured in a
crash of an airplane was entitled to compensation even though
his main employment was that of a mechanic, as his flying was
tolerated by his employer and was beneficial to both the em2
plover and the employee. S
There has also been some variance in the state decisions on
the question as to whether or not the claimant (or his administrator) was an employee at the time of the accident out of which
the claim arose.
"' Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles et al., 47 F 2d 441, 1
Avi. 263 (1931) and see-Shults v. Colonial Flying Service, 262 N.Y.
.667, 188 N.E. 113 (1933) See also-Knipe v. Skelgas Co., 229 Iowa
740, 294 N.W 880, 1 Avi. 934 (1948).
5Fuhviler v. Mack International Motor Truck Corp. & Zurich
General Accident & Liability Insurance Co., 137 Pa. Sup. 421, 9 A. 2d
173, 1 Avi. 866 (1939).

Smith v. The Industrial Com. of Ohio, 7 0. Ops. 183, 32 N.E.

2d 215, 1 Avi. 608 (1936).
45 A. 2d 32, 2 Avi. 14,112 (N.J. Sup. 1946)
1 Shults, et al., v. Colonial Flying Service, Inc., 262 N.Y. 667,
In California, in a very recent decision, in
188 N.E. 113, (1933).
Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 2 Avi. 14,665
(May 25, 1948), the court awarded a workmen's compensation
award to decedent's widow when deceased flight instructor was
killed in an accident while taking his twelve year old daughter up
for a ride, even though this child had never been listed as a student,
and would not be eligible to apply for a license for several years.
'The court held that this death arose out of and in the course of de-cedent's scope of employment.
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In 1928, a Washington Supreme Court 29 decision held that
a pilot was an employee even though he received a portion of
the income from the flights he made as an instructor and from
sight-seeing trips, and received no other salary or income. The
court held that he -was an employee and not a partner.
There have been several cases on the question of whether the
claimant was an employee or an independent contractor, and
-whether,claimant was under the employ of is general employer
or the specific employer at the time -when the injury or death
occurred.
In the Montijo case, 30 a pilot was employed to perform
stunt flying by a motion picture company m conjunction with
other employees of the company The court held him to be not
an employee but an independent contractor saying that a pilot
who engages with his airplane in dangerous "stunt" flying for
motion pictures assumes the risk of injury to himself and to his
plane.
Again, in the Famous Players-Lasky Corp. case, 31 the court
held that an airplane pilot -who ii rented for the day with his
plane by an aircraft corporation to a motion picture producer
from whom he takes his orders, in the making of the picture, is
in the general employment of the aircraft company, and in the
special employ of the producer, and in case of injury may look
to either or both for compensation under Califoria law.
In Illinois, in Bird v Louer 32 in an action for the death of
a passenger killed in a mid air collision, while the plane was
being piloted by a pilot in the general employ of the owner of
the plane, the court said that although at this time the pilot was
flying under the orders of the passenger, and even though there
was a general custom between the passenger and the owner of
the plane for this passenger to pay the owner for the use of the
plane, the pilot was held to be an employee of the owner of the
plane.
'Hinds v. Department of Labor and Industries, 150 Wash. 230,
272 Pac. 734, 1 Avi. 143 (1928)
1 Montijo v. Samuel Goldwyn, 133 Cal. App. 57, 297 Pac. 949, 1.
Av 268 (1931). See also contra-Stiles v Universal Film Mfg. Co.
(1928)1 U.S. Av. R. 312.
' Famous Players-Lasky Corp. et al. v. Industrial Accident Com.
et al., 194 Cal. 134, 228 Pac. 5, 1 Avi. 65 (1924)
12 272 Ill. App. 522, 1 Avi. 486, 1934 U.S.
Av R. 188 (1934)
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In Texas, 33 a pilot employed by the president of a manufacturing company to pilot him on company business in a plane
owned by the president individually was held to be covered by
the company's workmen's compensation insurance on the
grounds that the pilot's pay was paid by the company under the
expenses -of the president, although his name was not included
in the payroll. IHe was not considered to be an independent contractor because he was in many ways subject to orders.
From the forbg6ing, it is clearly evident that there is an
abundance of confusion, m the state statutes themselves, and
great variations in the intent of the legislatures, and in the interpretations of the courts.
The amount of variance, no doubt, seems greater in this
particular field, because of the nature of the business and the
wide raiifications within it.
III.
TUE DEVELOP-MENT OF WORKEN'S

COMPENSATION

SINXCE 1917

Since 1917 the United States Supreme Court has upheld all
types and features of Workmen's Compensation acts with minor
exceptions, 34 upon the justification of the police powers of the
govering bodies, the right of the State and Federal governments to protect the health and welfare of the workmen.
Those provisions that have been held unconstitutional include a feature that attempted to reopen a previously closed
case;35 to take jurisdiction of exclusively maritime injuries;36
to apply a state act to the already preempted field of interstate
railroad injuries;" 7 and the 1927 Longshoremens and Harbor
Texas Employer's Insurance Ass'n. v Kelly, 56 S.W 2d 1108,
(Tex. Civ. App.), 1 Avi. 416 (1932).
" Question of due process, State ex rel. Williams v Industrial
Commission, 116 Ohio 45, 156 N.E. 486 (1927)

Question of no liability without fault, Western Indemnity Co. v.

Pillsbury, 151 Pac. 398 (Cal. 1915).
Loss of jury trial, State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 210, 117 Pac.
1101 (1911).
Unequal treatment before the law, Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v.
Blogg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915).

Loss of employer's right to contract, Clevenger v. Burgess, 31

S.W 2d 675 (Tex. Civ App. 1930).
1 Casieri's case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N.E. 118 (1934).

The remainder of the statute abolishing res adjudicata for future
cases was upheld.
-*Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
27New York'Central Ry. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1947)
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Workers Act was sustained with a provision for trials de novo
over questions of jurisdiction.s
In admiralty cases there is a recognized penumbra, a twilight zone, where only magicians can draw the line between
Federal and State Workmen's Compensation Acts. 39 Under the
"twilight zone doctrine" the recovery is allowed under a state
statute where the employer has failed to obtain federal coverage.
The doctrine also upholds the state coverage wherever the
plaintiff's duties are not primarily in navigation.
Many employers tried to avoid liability under state compensation acts on the grounds that injuries sustained by an employee while he was engaged in interstate commerce were not
compensable, that when the Constitution gave Congress the
right to regulate interstate commerce, it ipso facto, made it impossible for State Industrial Commissions to make any awards,
that injuries sustained on interstate busses, trains and airplanes
were beyond state jurisdiction. So it has been held until the
Federal Employees Liability Act which applies to railway em40
ployees.
Until Congress preempts the field by a Federal Interstate
injurv law for trucks, airplanes, etc., the states may continue
4
to extend their compensation protection. 1
Or a state can deliberately cut down its jurisdictional rights
and prerogatives, as has been done in Tennessee, West Virginia
and Colorado.
Where no limitation exists in the state act. all interstate and
intrastate injuries by truck, bus, plane, sleeping cars, street
" Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361 (1930).
"Where the matter was held to be of mere "local concern"--a
state matter until a ship is sent into service. Grant Smith Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922)
,OLighthouses-even 12 miles out.
U.S. Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F 2d 251 (1933).
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. McMamgel, 87 F 2d 332 (1937).
U.S. Employees Compensation Act applies to:
(1) Civil employees of U.S.
(2) Employees of Panama and Alaskan Railways
(3) Employees of District of Columbia except policemen and
firemen
(4) Those employed in timber and loggmg on Menommnee
Indian reservation
(5) Employees of Federal Civil Works Adm.
(6) Members of Officers Reserve, and enlisted reserve in times
of peace, coast guard, etc.
"Hall v. Industrial Commission, 131 Ohio St. 416 (1936).
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cars, etc., except interstate rail carriers, come exclusively under

the state Workmen's Compensation acts.
Prior to the 1939 Amendments to the Federal Employees.
Liability Act (1908) the following questions had to be considered first:
Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate commerce or in work so closely related to it as to be a
part of it.42
A worker also had to prove negligence to come under the
Federal Act, otherwise the state act was his only recourse.
The 1939 Amendment states "any employee of a carrier,
shall be the furtherance of interany part of whose duties
state or foreign commerce, or shall in any way directly or closely
be considered as beingor substantially affect such commerce
employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of Sections 51 to 59 of this.
title. "
This amendment supersedes part of the old rule of the
Shanks case, 43 which stated specific work at the time of the injury and not the work-man's general duties was the sole test.
The remainder of the Shanks case rule, "It is transporta44
tion, not commerce that counts," is still the law.
Thus uniformity is obtained for the transportation workers,
but excludes those who have nothing directly or closely to do.
with interstate transportation, such as the clerical workers, back
4-1. New York Central Ry Co. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260 (1915)
Train on interstate run.
2. New York Central Ry. Co. v Porter, 249 U.S. 168 (1919).
Direct work on interstate tracks and bridges in actual use.
3. Sullivan v. Booth, 202 N.Y.S. 807 (1924). Construction of
things later to be used by interstate railways; held to be under State
compensation acts until the things are actually put in service. See
also: Raymond v. Chicago Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 43 (1917), and Moser v
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 65 Idaho 479, 147 P 2d 336 (1944).
4. As to interstate material that has been abandoned: New
York, New Haven and Hartford Ry. Co. v Bezue, 284 U.S. 415(1932), and Industrial Accident Com. of California v. Davis, 259 U.S.
182 (1922).._
'Shanks v. Delaware, L. and W Ry. Co., 239 U.S. 556 (1916).
See also: Erm v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 36 F Supp. 936 (1941).
Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 113 P 2d 763
(Cal. 1941) aff. (1942) 120 P 2d 880.
"Senate Report No. 661, 76 Congress, 1st session p. 3. Contract
with: cases based on Fair Labor Standards Act. U.S. v. Darby, 31a
U.S. 100 (1941) and: on A.A.A. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
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shopmen, restaurant help, etc. These employees are still under
the State acts, until or unless the United States Supreme Court
interprets this amendment to be all-inclusive.
IV
PowrRs op CONGRESS

The next inquiry then is, whether it as within the power of
Congress to enact a statute clarifying conflict of law principles
as applied to workmen's compensation laws in their application
to employees engaged in civil aviation. There seems to be little
doubt that such power exists and can be based on two provisions
of the Constitution (1) the commerce clause,4 5 and (2) the full
40
faith and credit clause.
1. Power wnder the Commerce Claitse.
In order to discuss the power of Congress to enact such
legislation under the Commerce Clause, it is essential to consider
the Second Employes' Liability Act cases. 47 This decision up-held the constitutionality of the Second Federal Employees'
-Liability Act,48 the act fixing the liability for employees engaged in transportatibn by railroad in interstate commerce for
injuries incurred by their employees while engaged in such
-commerce.
Justice Van Devanter in his decision paraphrased Marshall's famous statement in Gibbons v. Ogden49 and stated.
"'This power over commerce among the states, so conferred upon
Congress, is complete an itself, extends incidentally to every instrument and agent by which such commerce is carried on, may
be exerted to its utmost extent over every part of such commerce,
and is subject to no limitations save such as are prescribed in
the Constitution."
cf" It does not admit of doubt that
Congress, m the
execution of its power over interstate commerce, may regulate
"Art.
I, Sec. 8.
"6Art. 4, Sec. 1.
Mondow v. N.Y. New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Babcock; N.Y., New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co. v Walsh;
Walsh v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
35 Stat. 65, as amended 36 Stat. 291.
'9 Wheat. 1 (1824)
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the relations of common carriers by railroad and their employees."
The Court also rejected the argument of the railroads that
Congress had exceeded its powers because of its abrogation of
the fellow servant rule, and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
The fact that a substantial measure of relief may have been
available under a variety of state laws could not affect the
power of Congress to supplant them by uniform national legislation. As the Court said.
"We are not unmindful that that end was measurably
attained through the remedial legislation of the several states,
but that legislation has been far from uniform, and it undoubtedlv rested with Congress to determine whether a national law,
operating uniformly in all the states upon all carriers by railroads engaged in interstate commerce would better serve the
needs of that commerce."
The doctrines expressed in this old case, of course, had
even at the time of the decision long been commonplaces, but
are restated here because these principles are sufficient in themselves to establish the power of Congress to enact the legislation
in question, quite aside from a consideration of the full faith
and credit clause.
Congress unquestionably has plenary power under the commerme clause to exclude the states entirely from the application
of their workmuen's compensation laws to interstate air carriers
and their employees. At Congress' choice, it may exclude the
states from the field entirely, or only partially, it may permit
state action only on conditions-any conditions that Congress
may see fit to inpose for the protection of commerce. That is,
Congress may authorize the making of regulations by which will
be deternuned the conflict of law principles to be followed by
the States with respect to workmen's compensation laws. The
States would be unable to object that such Federal regulations,
enacted under the commerce clause, were obnoxious to their
local policies, just as was decided when the State of Connecticut
objected to the Federal Employers Liability Act.
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2.

Pull Faith and Credit Clause.

When the force of the full faith and credit clause is added
to the commerce clause, there seems to be little doubt that there
is ample constitutional power to enact the proposed legislation.
Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution provides
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state. And Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner
in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved and
the effect thereof."
Congress heretofore has apparently never exercised the,
power thus conferred to alleviate the confusion m the field of
conflict of laws by regulations prescribing which of two or more
conflicting state statutes is to prevail. But there can be little
doubt that this power exists.
The history of this clause in the Constitutional Convention
offers substantial evidence that the clause was intended to empower CongTess to legislate in this manner. Valuable accounts of
the history of this clause appear in articles by Professor Edward
S. Corwin 5 and Professor Walter Wheeler Cook. 51
Quoting from Corwin's article in which he states
"The protest was raised against this clause, it will be recalled, that in vesting Congress with power to declare the effect
State laws should have outside the enacting state, it enabled the
new Government to usurp the powers of the States, but the objection went unheeded
"l
Indeed there are few clauses of the Constitution, the
merely literal possibilities of which have been so little developed
Congress has the power under the clause to decree the effects that the statutes of one State shall have in other States.
Or to speak in more general terms, Congress has, under the
clause, power to enact standards whereby uniformity of State
legislation may be secured as to almost any matter in connection
with which interstate recognition of private rights would be
useful and valuable.
5"The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. of PA. L. REV. 371
(1933).
' The Power of. Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
28 YALE L. J. 421 (1919)
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"Nor should the limited initiative taken by the Court in
this matter in recent years deter Congress from acting. The little
that can be accomplished by the judicial process of inclusion and
exclusion will go neither far nor fail toward meeting present day
necessities. Besides, it is to Congress that the Constitution reserves the initiative in the application of the full faith and
credit clause, not to the Court."
Cook comes to the same conclusion.
"(4) Compulsory recognition by the States of rights
created by legislative acts of other States. Here we enter upon
an unexplored field.
"
it is well worthwhile to inquire into the powers of Congress with reference to the enactment of legislation to make compulsory this interstate enforcement of vested rights instead of
leaving it, as how to depend upon the whim of the State legislatture or the notions of the State Court as to the conflict of laws.
A careful study of the evolution in the Constitutional Coivention of the wording of the full faith and credit clause, will it is
believed convince the impartial student that the final shaping
of the clause so as to give Congress power to prescribe the effect,
not only of judgments but also of such public acts, was intended
by the more nationally minded members of the Convention to
confer upon Congress some such power. True, we do not know
exactly what the members of the Convention expected Congress
to enact in the way of legislation, but it seems obvious that they
were conscious that they were conferring in somewhat general
language power on Congress to deal with the matter.
"
It is conceived that in place of the present chaotic
conditions which obtains in the field of the conflict of laws as
applied to interstate relations, Congress could by enacting such
a statute substitute, at least to a large extent, a code of uniform
national law."
While it is true that, at most, we can say the views of these
scholars are interesting, and it is the views of the Supreme Court
which must be our ultimate concern, we can answer that, too. as
the Court has stated unequivocally that Congress has the power
contended for by Cook and Corwin.
In the dissent of "Ur. Justice Stone in the case of Yarboroigh v. Yarborozigh,5 2 the Justice cites with approval the
290 U.S. 212 (1933)

.2

L.J.-4
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articles quoted above. This case involved the question of whether
South Carolina was required to accord full faith and credit to a
Georgia law which operated to relieve a husband, from whom
his wife had obtained a divorce in Georgia, from all obligation
to provide for the education and maintenance of their minor
child. Under its own law, South Carolina had directed the husband to make provision for the child. The majority of the Court
held that the Georgia law, as a legal incident of the Georgia
divorce decree, was entitled to full faith and credit and, therefore. South Carolina. was without power to enforce a decree for
maintenance of the child.
Justice Stone in his dissent said:
"'The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as
defined by this Court may in some degree not fully defined, be
expanded or contracted by Congress. AMuch of the confusion and
procedural deficiencies which the constitutional provision alone
The constituhas not avoided may be remedied by legislation.
prescribe
the effect to
tional provision giving Congress power to
been quite
would
have
proceedings
be given to acts, records and
unnecessary had it not been intended that Congress should have
a latitude broader than that given the courts. The. play which
has been afforded for the recognition of local public policv m
cases where there is called in question only a statute of another
State. as to the effect of which Congress has not legislated, compared with the more restricted scope for local policy where there
is a judicial proceeding, as to which Congress has legislated, suggests the Congressional power."
In the Alaska Packers case,5 3 discussed supra, the Court
states in the case of statutes, the extra territoriality of which
Congress has not prescribed, where the policy of one state
statute comes into conflict with that of another, the necessity of
some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two states
is still more important.
While the Court's indication of the power of Congress may
be termed only parenthetical, the meaning of the phrase is unmistakable.
In the Pacific IRsuramce case," the court states in the case
of statutes, the extra state effect of which Congress has not pre"294 U.S. 532 (1934).
306 U.s. 466 (1938).
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the full
scribed as it may under the constitution provision
faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute
for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it.
the conflicting statute of another state.
It would be hardly possible for the Court to declare in
clearer terms that Congress has power under the full faith and
credit clause to determine the principles of the conflict of laws
by which the states shall be governed. It is true that the above
statements are dicta, but no opinions given by the Court can be
other than dicta until Congress enacts legislation pertinent to
the subject.
V
CONCLUSION

Thus it has been shown that the two preliminary questions
have been answered, first, that there is at present "uncertainty
and confusion" in the field of Workmen's Compensation in
Civil Aviation, to an extent which warrants clarifying federal
legslation, and secondly, that within the framework of the
United States Constitution, Congress has ample power to enact
legislation.
While it is true that the matter of State's rights versus
Federal jurisdiction has always been a delicate subject, it is a
reasonable and common-sense deduction that there should be no
conflict on this question relative to these rights respecting air
commerce generally
It is quite true that State's rights must, insofar as is consistent with good government, be protected, but when as in this
case, the problem involves the fastest mode of travel in the
world, a mode of travel that has an effect, either directly or indirectly, on all the people of all the states.
Just as it has seemed sensible and logical and to the best interests of the United States, to enact the federal legislation that
has been enacted in the Air Commerce Acts of 1926 and 1938,
so it seems to be only a furtherance of those interests to clarify
the situation in the field of Workmen's Compensation.

